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FEDERAL JUDICIAL CONTROL OF STATE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RICHARD C. BAKERO
It is pretty generally agreed that many matters which in the past were
regarded as lying wholly within state control, are now being subjected
gradually to national authority. A recent phase of this development has
to do with federal judicial review of state criminal administration. By
means of the reviewing process, the federal judiciary occasionally nullifies
those court convictions which are an essential element of the state's police
power. The preservation of the public peace, repose and good order under
this power is one of the most important obligations thrust impliedly upon
the states by the federal constitution.
There are basically two procedures by which the federal courts exert
their influence over state criminal justice. One of these is by reviewing
state convictions on appeal; the other is by testing them under writs of
habeas corpus. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court consults the
record of the case made below, after which it either affirms, modifies or
reverses the judgment rendered there. In a habeas corpus proceeding, the
federal courts make a collateral examination of the judgment, the object
of which is to ascertain whether it has been found properly from a more*
or less mechanical standpoint. The courts in this type of proceeding are
expected to concern themselves with the extrinsic rather than the intrinsic
aspects of such determinations. Though state officials are heard to inveigh
against both of these devices for scrutinizing their criminal trials, they
reserve their stronger criticism for the habeas corpus process.
*Professor of Political Science, Harding College, Searcy, Arkansas; A.B., Har-
vard; A.M., Cornell; Ph.D., Columbia; Member, New York Bar.
(109)
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The origin of the habeas corpus writ is somewhat uncertain. But one
thing about its inception which appears secure is that it first emerged
in medieval England. The courts of that country brought it into being
somewhere in the fourteenth century, and continued to nurture it for two
hundred years or so while it assumed a fairly definite shape. In the seven-
teenth century, during the era of Stuart despotism, the writ was given a
more concrete and stabilized form by the British Parliament. By the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 that body endowed it with a statutory quality
and eminence.
For many decades the writ was used in England primarily as a brake
upon executive action.' Situations would arise wherein the king's officers
would seize a person without the slightest color of law, thrust him into
prison, and keep him there until the prosecuting attorney saw fit to bring
him to trial. Sometimes the period of delay would run into years. But
with the advent of the habeas corpus device, such arbitrary procedures
suffered a rebuff. Through the use of this invention, a court could compel
the jailor to bring a prisoner before it, and if it then found the appropriate
detention process lacking or defective, would set the accused free.
The writ, however, was also directed now and then against judicial
conduct. It was used, for example, where two courts claimed jurisdiction
over the same person.2 In such an instance, the one asserting the superior
authority would issue the writ virtually ordering the lower court to send
up for trial a defendant whom it was holding for that purpose. Usually
the subordinate tribunal complied with the mandate from above.
But if there was involved merely the question whether a particular
court or any court, under the law, had jurisdiction over the prisoner, the
issue was resolved by the trial judge with right of appeal to a higher
bench. An issue of this sort was not regarded as the proper subject for
a habeas corpus proceeding. Likewise, where it was alleged that the de-
fendant had been denied certain procedural rights, the matter was ad-
1. The late Justice Robert Jackson stated in one of his more recent opinions:
"The historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by executive au-
thorities without judicial trial." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433, 533 (1953). See
also Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus: A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179(1949); Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313
(1948); Wyzanski, The Writ of Habeas Corpus, 243 ANNALS 101 (1946); Note,
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 55 COL. L. REV. 196-209 (1955).
2. Howard, Habeas Corpus, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 233ff. (1932).
[Vol. 22
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judicated in the criminal action rather than in a special habeas corpus
proceeding such as is permitted today in this country. Nor would the writ
be granted where it was claimed that a court had failed of jurisdiction
because it was acting under an invalid law, the reason being of course that
an act of Parliament or settled principle of the common law was seldom, if
ever, questioned judicially in England on grounds of unconstitutionality.
The scope of the writ in our early colonies, it might be added here, was
substantially as broad as it was in the mother land.
Instances in which federal intervention in state criminal proceedings
by habeas corpus is actually necessary always have been and still are rela-
tively few. These few invariably pertain to attempts by a state to interfere
with the execution of the sovereign national power. They rarely concern
the purported civil rights of individuals, which the federal government is
charged with protecting. Any attacks upon these usually can be litigated
and determined under writs of certiorari directed by the Supreme Court
to the highest state court.
The first Congress, realizing the true function of the writ, strictly
limited its issuance by the federal judiciary whenever a prisoner held under
state process was involved. In the Judiciary Act of 1789 Congress pro-
vided that the writ should "in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless
where they are in custody under or by colour of the authority of the United
States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are
necessary to be brought into court to testify."' In other words, this section
allowed the writ to be granted in behalf of a person in a state jail and
under state process only when he was needed to give testimony in a federal
court.
The first effort to make the writ available as a direct limitation upon
state criminal power took place in 1833. There occurred that year the
celebrated nullification controversy in South Carolina, during which several
federal officials were arrested for attempting to execute the United States
tariff laws in that state. Congress, in order to free these men and also to
protect others enforcing the national authority, empowered federal judges
to grant writs of habeas corpus to all persons so detained by a state. The
statute involved provided for the issuance of the process to a prisoner in
3. 1 STAT. 82 (1784).
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jail on account of an act he had "done or omitted to be done, in pursuance
of a law of the United States, or any order, process or decree of any judge
or court thereof."'" While the measure may have had a broader connotation,
it was designed principally to release persons incarcerated for carrying out
a federal law or mandate.
Nine years'later, the use of the writ was expanded to cover situations
which threatened to disturb our amicable international relations. This
expansion stemmed from the arrest of a British subject named Alexander
MceLeod, who in 1841 was charged by New York state with killing an
American citizen for having given aid to the insurgents in the 1837 re-
bellion against the Canadian government. The British foreign office on that
occasion demanded the immediate release of MeLeod, asserting that he
had committed the homicide while executing a valid command of the Eng-
lish government. Our state department, while sympathizing with the
British position, felt constrained nevertheless to deny the request, giving
as the reason for its refusal that, under our constitutional system, the
trial of MeLeod was entirely a concern of New York state. Fortunately,
for our amity with England and Canada, the New York jury in 1842
acquitted the defendant and the incident was closed. Congress, however,
was determined to forestall a repetition of this occurrence, and immediately
authorized the federal courts to grant a writ of habeas corpus to any per-
son in state custody alleging imprisonment for an act done pursuant to the
order of a friendly government.'
Thus by the time Congress was ready to widen again the coverage of
the writ, there were essentially three situations in which a federal court
through its issuance might release a prisoner from state confinement. It
might release him if 1) he was needed to testify in a federal court, 2) he
had been arrested by a state for attempting to enforce a federal law, or
3) he was being restrained in his liberty by a state for acts done under
the authority of a friendly power.
The next extension of the writ came in 1867 during the tragic Re-
construction days in the South. To protect the newly liberated negroes, the
so-called scalawags and the northern carpetbaggers from illegal arrest
4. 4 STAT. 634 (1833).
5. 5 STAT. 539 (1842).
[Vol. 22
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and incarceration at the hands of the Southern governments, Congress
enacted one of the most sweeping measures of its kind. The law in ques-
tion authorized federal tribunals to issue the writ to any prisoner "in
custody in violation of the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.' That the law was of the catch-all variety, fashioned to bring
every type of state criminal action based upon a federal claim under the
survey of the national tribunals, was attested by Chief Justice Salmon
P. Chase. When discussing this law in the famous McCardle case, the Chief
Justice remarked :"
This legislation is of the most comprehensive character. It brings
within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and every
judge every possible case of privation of liberty, contrary to the
national constitution, treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen
this jurisdiction.
But broad and comprehensive as the coverage of this law might be,
the use of the federal habeas corpus writ was still restricted to those
situations where a positive federal authority was involved, or where the
states were either forbidden to exert certain powers or were circumscribed
in exercising them. Essentially, the only such powers at the time amenable
to federal control were those mentioned negatively or otherwise in section
10 of article one, sections one and two of article four and the thirteenth
amendment of the Constitution. This limited employment of the writ,
however, soon ceased, for in 1868 came the fourteenth amendment with its
unbounded capabilities. That amendment's vague, nebulous and all-em-
bracing due process clause, its privileges and immunities provision and
its equal protection section gave Congress and the courts almost limitless
authority to curb nearly every kind of state action.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, it should be stated here parenthetical-
ly, was not conceived entirely in a spirit of good will and impartiality, as
anyone familiar with the history of the Reconstruction era is aware. Nor
for that matter was the fourteenth amendment. Both were adopted when
the memories of Andersonville and Libby were still green, and the other
hates and animosities engendered by the War between the States remained
unabated. The law of 1867 was designed, as it soon became apparent, to
6. 14 STAT. 385 (1867).
7. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 825 (1868).
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protect primarily those in sympathy with the new Reconstruction policy
of Congress and was not meant as a safeguard for those who disagreed
with it. The McCardle case well illustrated this attitude.8
Although given a wide grant of power in habeas corpus matters, the
federal courts for a number of years used it sparingly as applied to state
criminal cases. For the most part, the power was exercised only in those
instances where the state had assumed a jurisdiction which it did not con-
stitutionally possess, as the term was historically understood. Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Bradley stated the prevailing practice in 1880 in
Ex parte Siebold:
The only ground on which this court, or any court, without some
special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to
a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the
want of jurisdiction in such court over the prisoner or cause,
or some other matter rendering its proceeding void.
Justice Bradley did not make clear what some of the "other matters"
might be like, to which he alluded here, but it is obvious that he felt that
the federal habeas corpus power under existing law was strictly circum-
scribed and limited primarily to jurisdictional questions.
But shortly after the foregoing decision was handed down, the Supreme
Court began tampering with this general rule in two ways. First, it com-
menced giving the term jurisdiction a much broader connotation than it
enjoyed when used in its historic sense. Second, it initiated the concept of
8. This case arose in 1867 with the arrest of William H. McCardle in the
South for criticizing the military officials in command in that area. When he was
tried there before a military tribunal, he sought a writ of habeas corpus to chal-
lenge the jurisdiction of that court. The writ was denied and he appealed from this
denial to the United States Supreme Court. However, while this appeal was
pending, Congress withdrew the appellate power of this high tribunal to hear
such cases. It did so out of fear that the court might feel constrained to declare
the law under which the military tribunal was created, and inferentially all other
Reconstruction measures, unconstitutional. The Act repealing the Supreine Court's
appellate power was enacted March 27, 1868. 15 STAT. 82 (1868). A short time
thereafter when the question of the validity of the repeal law itself was presented
to the Supreme Court, that body, having no desire to lock horns with Congress,
which was in an ugly mood, proceeded, after considerable procrastination, to hold
the measure valid. Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 514 (1869). Sixteen years later,
long after the Reconstruction period had come to a close, Congress restored this
appellate power to the Supreme Court. 23 STAT. 437 (1885).
9. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1880).
(Vol. 22
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1957], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss2/1
1957] FEDERAL CONTROL OF STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 115
courts "losing" jurisdiction in the course of a proceeding, even though they
had possessed it at the start of an action. In 1885, the Supreme Court
held, for example, that a court forfeited its jurisdiction if it failed to in-
dict a prisoner through a grand jury, where such a jury was constitutional-
ly established. This ruling was based on the theory that the grand jury
is as much a part of the court as the judge himself, without whom ob-
viously the court would be incomplete and hence lacking in jurisdiction."°
The court found, however, almost simultaneously, that neither failure to
provide a legally constituted grand jury," nor denial of compulsory process
to a prisoner caused a forfeiture of jurisdiction; in each such case, it held,
there was involved a mere matter of irregularity rather than one of con-
stitutionality."
But though the Supreme Court of the eighteen hundred eighties was
unable to discern any relationship between denial of compulsory process
as provided in the sixth amendment and jurisdiction, the same court of
the nineteen hundred thirties saw a definite association between jurisdic-
tion and another right protected by that amendment, namely, the right
to counsel. In 1932 the Supreme Court began holding that compulsory
appointment of counsel for certain defendants was part of due process, 1"
and intimated that a lack of due process might cause forfeiture of juris-
diction. In a more recent decision1 ' the Court, speaking through Justice
Black, went a step farther and declared bluntly that neglect to appoint
10. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885); Ex parte Bain, Jr., 121 U.S. 1
(1887). It is somewhat puzzling how a grand jury indictment, which is only a
procedural right, and therefore waivable by the defendant, can have any relation
to the matter of jurisdiction. U.S. v. Gill, 55 F.2d 399 (D. N.M. 1931); Patton v.
U.S., 281 U.S. 276 (1929) ; Edward v. State, 45 N.J.L. 419 (1883) ; State v. Longo,
132 N.J.L. 515, 41 A.2d 317 (1945) ; De Gayler v. Corwin, 314 Mass. 525, 51 N.E.
2d 251 (1943). It is puzzling also since in many jurisdictions such an indictment
is not even required, and hence no longer regarded universally as a fundamental
right.
11. The grand jury in the particular case in point was illegal because it in-
cluded an ineligible alien. Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782 (1882) ; Keizo v. Henry,
211 U.S. 146 (1908).
12. Ex parte Harding, supra n. 11. See also Cooke v. U.S., 267 U.S. 517(1925). In 1906 the Supreme Court held that invasion of the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination constituted no jurisdictional defect. Matter of Moran,
203 U.S. 96 (1906).
13. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See also Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S.
672 (1948); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323
U.S. 458 (1945); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); De Meerleer v. Michigan,
329 U.S. 663 (1947); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 56 (1947).
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counsel for most indigent defendants rendered the trial court incomplete
and hence deprived of any jurisdiction it may have had."
The federal courts in late years have been paying less attention to
the jurisdictional factor and giving more heed to allegations of lack of
due process and of "fundamental fairness"'" when issuing writs of habeas
corpus. They are allowing the writs, for example, where it is charged
that a confession has been obtained by inducement, fraud, trickery or
duress." They are also granting them where the complaint is that the
prisoner has been convicted on false testimony known to be such by the
prosecutor, 8 or was tried under the alleged influence of mob violence.'"
Some legal authorities argue that the courts by using these grounds for
issuing the writ have actually abandoned altogether the jurisdictional
element. Attorney General H. R. Fatzer of Kansas, however, questions
this diagnosis; he thinks rather that the courts have extended the meaning
of the term jurisdiction to include due process of law. "The term 'juris-
diction' ", asserts the Attorney General, "has been so extended in the
Federal courts that it has come to be synonymous with 'with due process
of law', and if due process is violated, the Federal courts have held that
jurisdiction is lost and the writ will issue.""
Most federal habeas corpus proceedings dealing with state convictions
originate in the district courts, though the appellate tribunals may also
grant them. The district court usually issues the writ only after a convic-
tion has been returned in a state court and later examined under a writ
15. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has held that it is part of due
process of law for a state, at its own expense, to furnish an indigent defendant
with a copy of the record of his trial to be used on appeal. The court ruled thus
despite the fact that an appeal is usually more a matter of grace than of right.
Guffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
16. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra n. 14; Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952);
Carter v. People of the State of Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) ; Gibbs v. Burke, 337
U.S. 773 (1946).
17. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433,
483 (1953); Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Stroble v. California, 343
U.S. 181 (1952) ; Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
18. Lesser v. New York, 304 N.Y. 903 (1953), 305 N.Y. 569 (1953); U.S.
ex rel. Lesser v. New York, 34 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. N.Y. 1940); Lesser v. Hunt,
117 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1941).
19. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See also Holtzoff, Collateral Re-
view of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. REV. (1945).
20. Hearings before Sub-Committee No. 8 of Committee on Judiciary of House
of Representatives on HR. 5649, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 55ff. (1955).
[Vol. 22
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of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. However, once this
process is complete, the district court, under the habeas corpus writ, may
have a veritable field day, probing into every nook and cranny of a state
criminal trial. It may then retry old issues which have been decided previ-
ously by the state judge and jury and affirmed not only by the state ap-
pellate courts but also directly or indirectly by the United States Supreme
Court. Or, it may try new issues related to the case, which were not ad-
judicated by the state court in the original proceeding and of which that
tribunal never heard." These federal courts in fact have used the writ for
so many various and sundry purposes and on so many different occasions
that it might appropriately be called the "wild ass of the law." This term
incidentally was originated by a Kentucky state judge'2 to describe the writ
of error coram nobis, which recently has come in for considerable abuse at
the hands of some state courts. 'Where no other process is available to serve
a given situation this one will be invoked by these tribunals.
There is a large segment of opinion among the bar and state officials
opposing this virtually unrestricted use of the federal habeas corpus writ
to scrutinize state criminal judgments. This group is not hostile to any and
all examinations of such judgments under the writ but believes rather that
they should be held to the minimum. It feels that the process should be
allowed only in those cases where a state fails to provide an appropriate
technical procedure by which attacks upon their judgments on federal
grounds can be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court on appeal
from their highest courts under certiorari.
The procedural devices commonly used in the state judicial systems to
review criminal judgments are the writ of error, the writ of habeas corpus,
the writ of error coram nobis and the simple motion to set aside a judg-
ment or otherwise reopen the case."3 The writ-of error, however, is employed
usually by a higher state tribunal only to examine the record made in the
lower court, which means that certain matters which lie de hors that record
will not reach the United States Supreme Court for examination on appeal.
21. Id. at 109. Reports of the Habeas Corpus Committee of the Conference of
Chief Justices, Chicago, Illinois, August 14, 1954.
22. Judge Sims in Anderson v. Buchanan, 292 Ky. 810, 823, 168 S.W.2d 48
(1943).
23. Hearings, op. cit. supra n. 20, pp. 63ff. See also Carter v. People of the
State of Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act, 69 HARv. L. Rnv. 1289 (1952); FRANK, CORAM NoBis (1953).
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The habeas corpus writ, in turn, is granted generally in state courts solely
for the purpose of scanning the jurisdiction of the trial court, and con-
sequently here also certain matters de hors the record may fail to reach
the Supreme Court on appeal. The writ of error coram nobis, while avail-
able to test matters not known to the trial court, nevertheless often is
restricted by a time limitation, which prevents a defendant in either the
original or the appellate court from making use of certain facts pertinent
to his case that belatedly have come to his attention. The simple motion
may possibly suffer from any or all of these infirmities.
At present the law permits the federal courts to issue the writ only
after all available remedies in the state forums for reviewing alleged dep-
rivations of federal rights have been exhausted, or where there is either an
absence of any state corrective processes by which claims of this sort may
be reviewed, or circumstances have rendered such processes ineffective.
The pertinent statute reads as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there
is either an absence of available State corrective process or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner.
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the reme-
dies available in the courts of the State within the meaning of
this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise,
by any available procedure, the question presented.
It is fairly well established by the Supreme Court that the term "ex-
haustion of state remedies" includes an appeal to that court on writ of
certiorari." In other words, the phrase signifies that after the Supreme
Court has denied an appeal on certiorari, then and only then, may a de-
feated defendant have recourse to habeas corpus. However, under existing
procedures, as just stated,2" once the "exhausting" process is complete, the
prisoner may sue out as many writs of habeas corpus or for whatever pur-
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952).
25. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1945).
26. See page 116.
[Vol. 2
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poses he desires. These writs may deal with new matters or they may
concern old ones already adjudicated through the state courts and the
United States Supreme Court. It is to compel such new matters to be
determined first in the state courts wherever possible and to prevent the
re-trial of the old issues that limiting the scope of the writ is being urged.
Those who sponsor curbing the use of the writ generally are ready to
adopt the proposal suggested recently by the Conference of Chief Justices,
the Association of Attorneys-General and the Judicial Administration Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association. The proposal would amend section
2254 as follows:2"
A justice of the Supreme Court, a circuit judge, or a district
judge, shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus
in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a
State court, only on a ground which presents a substantial Federal
constitutional question (1) which was not theretofore raised and
determined, (2) which there was no fair and adequate oppor-
tunity theretofore to raise and have determined, and (3) which
cannot thereafter be raised and determined in a proceeding in the
State court, by an order or judgment subject to review of the Su-
preme Court of the United States on writ of certiorari.
An order denying an application for a writ of habeas corpus
by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of State court shall
be reviewable only on a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court
of the United States. The petition for the writ of certiorari shall
be filed within thirty days after entry of such order.
This proposed amendment essentially required six conditions to be
met before a writ of habeas corpus may be issued by the federal courts in
State criminal cases. First, a substantial and not a frivolous or perfunctory
federal question must be involved. Second, the question at issue must be
one which has not been raised before in a state court. If it has been so
raised and carried through the United States Supreme Court on certiorari,
it may never be brought up again. Third, the question must have been
one which could not have been raised or determined in a state court pro-
ceeding, subject to review by the United States Supreme Court, for the
27. Hearings, op.cit., supra n. 20, pp. 1, 7.
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reason that no fair opportunity for it to be raised has been afforded. If it
is one that could have been so raised and determined, and a fair opportunity
has been given for this purpose but the defendant has not availed himself
of it, he should not be allowed to do so later by a writ of habeas corpus.
Fourth, even if the question has not been raised and no fair opportunity
has been offered for it to be done, it must appear that the question cannot
therefore be determined by an order or judgment capable of being re-
viewed by the Supreme Court under certiorari. Fifth, the writ, if permitted
under the rules set forth above, shall be reviewable only by the United
States Supreme Court, and not first by the United States Court of Ap-
peals as present practice allows. Sixth, the petition for the writ of cer-
tiorari must be filed within thirty days after the entry of the state court
order.
One of the effects of the amendment would be that federal judges,
henceforth willing to carry out the spirit of the amendment, probably could
keep many more state criminal proceedings out of the federal courts than
they presently do. They could, in good conscience, dismiss spurious and
even doubtful petitions for writs of habeas corpus in summary fashion.
A second result would be that, where a matter had been determined once
in a state court with certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, it
could not be renewed time and time again as is now permitted. It would
not be given the second, third and even fourth "bite" which it is now
frequently accorded. A third effect would be that the prisoner would not
be allowed to raise on separate and distinct occasions issues known to him
to exist at one and the same time. He would be required to raise them
simultaneously, and then be foreclosed from pressing some of them at later
dates. A fourth result would be that the burden would fall on the de-
fendant to show that there is no way by which he can go back to the state
courts and obtain relief by normal review to the United States Supreme
Court, when he alleges that the state failed in the first instance to furnish
him -with a fair opportunity to have his case adjudicated by the state
judiciary with such review to the Supreme Court."' A fifth effect would
be the by-passing of the United States Court of Appeals on appeals from
a district court writ, thereby eliminating one important step in the final
disposal of a case. Appeals from the district court henceforth would go
28. Id. at p. 52.
[Vol. 22
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directly to the Supreme Court. A sixth would be that, with the time
limited within which the petition for certiorari must be filed, the defendant
could no longer let his appeal lie dormant for an extended period and then
revive it only after all other efforts at liberation had failed and the
gallows trap was perhaps about to be sprung.
But salutary as these efforts to curb the use of the writ might appear,
they probably would not be as effective as their sponsors have hoped. It
doubtless would be found that the present inordinate delays in the federal
courts have not been materially eliminated or shortened. For, under the
new scheme, a federal court would still be required to examine each habeas
corpus petition, even though it might later deny it, in order to ascertain
whether it complies with the requirements of the amendment." If the
presiding judge should be hypersensitive on the subject of civil rights, he
might insist upon a thorough investigation of the government's allegation
that the prisoner had not so complied; and in that case, a number of days
might be consumed in taking testimony. Then too, every time a district
judge denies a petition, the defendant could continue to ask the United
States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, which it sometimes would
grant.
Furthermore, under the proposed arrangement many federal district
courts, when dismissing petitions for the writ, undoubtedly would not
give them the same thorough attention they do now. In that event the
Supreme Court would be required to make its own investigation of the
merits of each almost de novo and without the benefit of the "spade work"
which the federal district courts now provide. Also, whatever aid this
tribunal had been receiving from the court of appeals in such cases would
be lost, since that bench would be stripped of its jurisdiction over matters
of this type. In other words, the two lower federal courts would no longer
serve as masters, as it were, making findings and reporting them to the
Supreme Court to be availed by it in making its own determinations.
United States Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank summed up the situa-
tion this way to the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives :s
Experience has shown that the Supreme Court does not now
have time carefully to consider all of the many certiorari petitions
29. Id. at 74. See statement of Irving Ferman.
30. Id. at 16.
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filed with it. . . The virtue of the now existing procedure is
this: The Federal district Court and the Federal court of Ap-
peals have carefully canvassed the case before the Supreme Court
is asked to pass on it. The opinions of the lower courts greatly
aid the Supreme Court in determining whether to grant review.
A few live cases should illustrate the confusion and delay which state
criminal administration encounters from the excessive granting of federal
writs of habeas corpus as well as appeals and writs of certiorari. In order
to appreciate the full significance of the condition thus created it might be
well to chronologize in tedious detail one representative case and sum-
marize several others. The confusion and delay mentioned here, it should
be pointed out, result not so much because the federal courts actually
discharge many state prisoners but rather because they provide them with
a forum in which to practice dilatory tactics. The case selected for the
purpose at hand is designated as the State of Utah v. Neal, in which the
chain of events runs as follows :"1
May 23, 1951, Neal killed Sgt. Owen T. Farley; October 2, 1951,
trial began in Utah Third District Court; October 4, 1951, Neal
found guilty of first degree murder; October 16, 1951, motion
for new trial denied and Neal sentenced to die on December 13,
1951; notice of appeal filed with Utah Supreme Court and stay
of execution granted pending appeal; February 15, 1952, ap-
peal filed in Utah Supreme Court; October 6, 1952, case argued
before Utah Supreme Court; March 28, 1953, conviction affirmed
by Utah Supreme Court; July 20, 1953, petition for rehearing
filed; October 29, 1953, petition denied; November 5, 1953, Utah
Supreme Court stays execution pending application to the United
States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari; May 4, 1954, United
States Supreme Court denied writ of certiorari; May 15, 1954,
Neal sentenced to die June 19, 1954; June 4, 1954, petition for
writ of habeas corpus filed with United States District Court of
Utah; June 11, 1954, United States District Court denied peti-
tion; June 16, 1954, appeal to United States Court of Appeals,
31. See Id. at 46ff.; Don Jesse Neal v. Beckstead, Sheriff, 3 Utah 2d 403, 285
P. 2d 129 (1955). The chronology of this case, for the most part, was compiled by
Hon. E. R. Callister, Attorney General of Utah, for congressional subcommittee.
[Vol. 22
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Tenth Circuit, stay of execution granted by Court of Appeals;
June 22, 1954, United States Court of Appeals affirms district
court's denial of application for writ of habeas corpus; June
23, 1954, Neal sentenced to die on August 3, 1954; July 23, 1954,
Utah State Board of Pardons denies appeal for commutation of
'sentence; July 28, 1954, petition for writ of habeas corpus filed
with Utah Supreme Court, denied same date; July 31, 1954, stay
of execution granted by United States Supreme Court Justice
Tom Clark; April 4, 1955, United States Supreme Court denied
petition for writ of certiorari of both Utah Supreme Court's
denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and of the Federal
Court of Appeals' affirmance of the United States District Court's
denial of a writ of habeas corpus; April 8, 1955, Neal sentenced to
die on May 9, 1955; April 19, 1955, petition for writ of habeas
corpus fied in United States District Court of Utah; April 29,
1955, petition for writ of habeas corpus and stay of execution
denied by United States District Court; May 2, 1955, motion
to vacate United States District Court judgment and a stay
granted by that Court; May 7, 1955, motion to vacate United
States District Court's stay of execution taken under advise-
ment of Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and a stay granted by
that court; May 23, 1955, petition for writ of habeas corpus argued
before Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals; May 26, 1955, petition for
writ of habeas corpus denied by Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which, however, granted stay of execution until June 15, 1955;
June 27, 1955, District Court of Utah denied petition for writ of
coram nobis, and denial was upheld by Utah Supreme Court; writ
of certiorari denied by United States Supreme Court; Neal ex-
ecuted July 1, 1955.
Two similar cases in Utah which ran virtually the same gamut as the
Neal case were State v. Rraaseh and State v. Sullivan. Seven years after
their trials the defendants involved were finally executed on May 11, 1956."2
32. State v. Braasch and Sullivan, 229 P. 2d 289 (Utah 1951). See Hearings,
supra n. 20. Other comparable cases are Hawk v. O'Grady, 290 N.W. 911 (Neb.
1940); People v. Adamson, 210 P. 2d 13 (Calif. 1949); Smith v. Baldi, 362 Pa.
222 (1948); 344 U.S. 561 (1953); People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53 (Calif. 1949); Ex
parte Wells, 90 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Calif. 1950); State v. Wilson, 231 P.2d 288
(Wash. 1951).
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One of the most interesting and illustrative of these cases arose seven
years ago in Pennsylvania.'" The defendant had been convicted of first
degree murder in September of 1949. His conviction was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. A short time later,
the prisoner sought a writ of habeas corpus in a lower Pennsylvania court
but was rebuffed there. Soon thereafter the state supreme court likewise
denied the writ; and once again the United States Supreme Court re-
fused certiorari. These proceedings were followed by a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus to a federal district court, which after a hearing cover-
ing four hundred pages of testimony, rejected the application. The prisoner
then asked for executive clemency, but the Governor of the Commonwealth
declined to grant it. Subsequently, a petition for a habeas corpus writ was
presented to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which that tribunal was
unwilling to entertain. This denial was followed by a plea to United States
Supreme Court Justice Harold R. Burton for a stay of execution. Justice
Burton turned down the request with this statement:
Upon examination of this petition, the record of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania and the proposed petition for writ of cer-
tiorari, I find no substantial basis for granting the stay of execu-
tion and it is accordingly ordered.
One would expect that the decision of Justice Burton would have ended
the matter, but not so. The very next day a second petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was filed with a federal district court, the grounds on which
it was based being the same as those presented to the state supreme court
and to Justice Burton. The district judge granted a stay of execution and
held a three-day hearing, after which he denied the petition. The petitioner
later appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, which sent
the case back to the district court for a further finding of fact. After
another lengthy hearing the district court once more dismissed the petition.
Again the United States Court of Appeals came to the rescue, and this
time remanded the case to the district court for issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus. The Commonwealth sought a writ of certiorari from the
United States Supreme Court, but was refused it. This denial meant that a
new trial was necessary, and shortly thereafter it was held. Once more
33. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 367 Pa. 102, 79 A.2d 401 (1951).
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the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death
by the Pennsylvania trial court."4
In a similar New York case," there was involved the question of the
voluntariness of certain confessions. The prisoner, it was alleged, had been
duped or coerced into making one of the admissions. A few hours after
completing this admission he made several others, which all agreed lacked
the element of direct compulsion. There was some question, however,
whether these had been influenced by the former. The first jury hearing
the case decided that there had been no coercion connected with any of the
confessions, but the state court of appeals thought otherwise, holding that
the initial one was tainted with force and deception. This tribunal, more-
over, was not certain of its effects upon the subsequent confessions, and
sent the case to a new jury to determine that issue. This jury brought in
a verdict of guilty, thereby in effect deciding that the second confessions
were free from any infirmities associated with the first. This verdict the
court of appeals, with two judges dissenting, accepted. Certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court was asked but denied.
A short time after this denial, the defendant requested a writ of habeas
corpus from a federal district court, still claiming that the second con-
fessions were bad. That court refused the writ. The United States Court
of Appeals affirmed the denial, but was overruled by the United States
Supreme Court. This body, with three justices dissenting and one not
participating,"8 found that the subsequent confessions were infected with
the same poison as the first. Justice Black, alluding in his prevailing
opinion to the ruling enunciated by the various New York state courts,
the federal district court and the United States Court of Appeals sustaining
the verdict, stated tersely: "With this ruling we cannot agree."' In other
words, Black was saying that five justices now were deciding that the
juries which twice had heard the evidence regarding the subsequent con-
34. Heaings, supra n. 26, at 59ff. U.S. ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 103 F. Supp.
776, 778 (W.D. Pa. 1952), 203 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1953), 345 U.S. 960 (1953), 113 F.
Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1953), 208 F.2d Y65 (3d Cir. 1953), 123 F. Supp. 759 (W.D.
Pa. 1954), 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. U.S.
ex rel. Cleveland Thompson, 350 U.S. 875 (1955) ; See also Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania v. Darcy, 362 Pa. 259, 66 A.2d 663 (1949).
35. People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353 (1951), 304 N.Y. 468 (1952), 345 U.S. 918
(1953), 345 U.S. 946 (1953) ; Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
36. Minton, Reed and Burton dissented. Jackson did not sit.
37. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954).
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fessions, the trial judges who refused to set aside the verdicts in the case,
four of the New York Court of Appeals judges, the federal district judge,
the judges of the United States Court of Appeals and three of their own
colleagues were completely mistaken as to the finding of fact in the matter.
At the third trial, which was conducted without benefit of any of the
confessions, the jury convicted the defendant once more. The New York
State Court of Appeals, however, by a four to two vote, reversed, holding
that without the second confessions there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port a verdict of guilty."'
Another comparable case concerned the notorious kidnapper Roger
Touhy." Touhy had been convicted in 1924 by an Illinois jury, and
his conviction had been upheld by the appellate courts of that state. On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, he was refused a writ of
certiorari. Twenty years later, after a substantial number of pleadings
in the interval had been denied in several different courts, the defendant,
whose attorney apparently had been following the trend of judicial think-
ing wherein civil rights were involved, sued out a writ of habeas corpus
in a federal district court in Illinois. The presiding judge in that pro-
ceeding decided in an opinion of 611 pages that the evidence atthe original
trial had been insufficient to sustain the conviction, and proceeded to re-
lease Touhy on bail. In so doing, he tacitly concluded that the Illinois
jury, the trial judge, the three judges of the Intermediate Illinois Appellate
Court, the seven judges of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and even the
nine justices of the United States Supreme Court all had erred in the early
nineteen thirties in sending Touhy to prison. The United States Court
of Appeals, however, immediately reversed the district judge to the extent
of requiring the defendant to remain in custody until the final disposition
of the case. The Supreme Court denied Touhy certiorari. In July, 1955,
the court of appeals overruled the district court and dismissed the writ
of habeas corpus.
Of the other cases of this variety, the one which has attracted the
most publicity and attention is that of Caryl Chessman, convicted rapist-
38. New York v. Leyra, 1 N.Y.2d 199 (1956).
39. Hearings, supra n. 20, at p. 12. U.S. ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, Warden, 348
U.S. 945 (1955); U.S. ex rel. Touhy v. Kipp, 348 U.S. 941 (1955), 200 F.2d 195(7th Cir. 1954). See also U.S. v. Ragen, 224 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1955) for
digest of proceedings in Touhy case.
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murderer in California. His particular case has been in and out of the state
and federal courts approximately eight years. Its record is replete with
writs of habeas corpus, state and federal, appeals, denials of writs of cer-
tiorari, granting of such writs, rehearings, and every other conceivable
type of proceeding even remotely pertinent to the matter. In the latest
attempt during January, 1956, to obtain a new trial, Federal Judge Louis
B. Goodman turned down Chessman's plea with the caustic comment that
his claim was a "complete fabrication" and based upon "false and
perjurious" charges."' Judge Goodman's ruling just recently was upheld
by the United States Court of Appeals, and it was thought in most legal
circles that this matter had finally been put to rest. Any such notion,
however, proved to be illusory for just recently the United States Supreme
Court has agreed to review the decision of this lower appellate tribunal.
In many such cases as these it can be stated with a large measure of truth
that the only way the state can enforce the death sentence is to precipitate
its execution between the denial of a habeas corpus petition by one court and
the granting of a stay by another.
The exasperation of the state judges at federal interference with
their criminal administration has been expressed vigorously by more than
one of them. But probably none of them has stated it more effectively
than Justice F. Henri Henriot of the Utah Supreme Court in the case of
Ex parte Sullivan :"
The United States District Court heard the evidence presented to
it, and if it had jurisdiction, as it claims, it very well could have
granted or denied the petition. 'Why it did neither, but chose to
permit this case to find haven again in this court by way of peti-
tion anew, is a matter of conjecture here and matter of opinion
there. In permitting and encouraging its voyage back to the Su-
preme Court of Utah, the Federal Court, in a judgment punc-
tuated by opinion, has intimated strongly that else we do its bid-
ding it quite assuredly will, creating the anomaly of two courts
40. Chessman v. Teets, 138 F. Supp. 761, 765 (N.D. Calif. 1956). See also
Matter of Chessman, 128 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Calif. 1955), 219 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.
1955), 221 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1955), 350 U.S. 3 (1955).
41. Ex parte Sullivan, 253 P.2d 378 (Utah 1953); Hearings, supra n. 20 at p.
47. The italicized "it" belongs to Justice Henriod.
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having concomitant jurisdiction, the one to survive the refusal of
the other to agree.
The free use made by federal judges of their habeas corpus power
permits all but the dullest criminals to shuttle their cases back and forth
between state and national courts and also within the federal judicial
hierarchy for a number of years. Lack of ingenuity to concoct and conceive
new grounds or variations of old ones for obtaining the writ constitutes
the only bar to these people remaining under the aegis of the federal
tribunals for an almost indefinite period. The techniques to be employed
in such instances are relatively simple, and a not-too scrupulous lawyer
no doubt would make use of them.
One of the most effective pieces of strategy is for the prisoner to make
some sort of confession, which the prosecutor will be certain to use against
him. At the same time, he should retain a young untried attorney, who
can front in court for an experienced but absent counsel. It would be well
also for him to watch carefully to see whether the names of anyone of his
particular profession, religion, race or economic status are in the jury
pool from which the panel trying him is drawn. It would likewise be
advisable for him to have a number of his friends stand in the rear of the
court room and, until removed, shout periodically, "hang him", or some
similar words of violence toward him. Nor would a fist fight with one of
his prison guards be entirely amiss. These proposals may appear to be
somewhat facetious and lacking in any possibilities of practical application,
yet, with some of our federal jurists in their present frame of mind, they
are by no means as devoid of merit and effectiveness as might be imagined.
The potency of the confession ruse should not be underestimated. It is
always possible for the prisoner to allege that his confession has been ex-
tracted through trickery, fraud and force, in which case he is certain to
obtain a sympathetic response from some member of the federal judicial
system. A charge of this sort should result in a stay of execution and
perhaps one, two or even three appeals. Even if he fails to secure redress,
the defendant still has gained time, which may be all important to him,
and he is not foreclosed from making a second attempt on precisely the
same grounds or from essaying another tack.
If the confession approach fails, the prisoner should then plead that
his youthful attorney, though willing, was actually incompetent. This
claim should be good also for a trip or two through the state courts as
[Vol. 22
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well as through the United States Supreme Court on certiorari, and then
back to the federal district court, to the United States Court of Appeals
and the United States Supreme Court in a habeas corpus proceeding. The
fact that his fledgling counsel was the prisoner's own choice will not deter
some judge from granting the habeas corpus writ; he will do so on the
theory that a defendant on trial for his life or faced with a long term
sentence is entitled as a matter of due process to be advised by a qualified
lawyer, regardless of all other considerations. If his plea is granted, the
prisoner may be set entirely free, or allowed to traverse again, under the
guidance of a more tested advocate, the long legal journey from arraign-
ment in the magistrate's court to the final disposition of his case in the
United States Supreme Court.
Not the least effective of the prisoner's claims will be that he was tried
before a jury drawn from a pool in which his religious faith, race, or call-
ing, as the case may be, was not properly represented. The law now decrees
that a Negro, for example, is not given a fair trial if the names of people
of his race are omitted completely or inequitably from the jury pool, and
many judges are quick to discern this type of discrimination whenever
pleaded. It has been strenuously urged and almost successfully so that
an accused is likewise denied an impartial trial if members of his economic
and social stratum are excluded.'" The Supreme Court, to be sure, has
denied this contention but by a very narrow margin, and this fact should
encourage rather than discourage a hard pressed prisoner to invoke this
plea. In so doing, there is a strong possibility that he will find a judge
who will agree with him, and also hope with him, that the Supreme Court
in a new case may reverse its earlier decision. It has been known before
to do that very thing.
If all of the efforts here mentioned prove futile, the prisoner then
should ask for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the court con-
victing him was dominated by a mob threatening to lynch him and even
assault the court. He might well couch his position in the language of
Justice Holmes: "Counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end
by an irresistible wave of public passion, and the State courts failed to
correct the wrong."'" The mere cry of "hang him" is certain to arouse
42. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947). See also Foley, Class Discrimina-
tion in Selection of Jurors, 5 CATHOLIc U.L. REV. 151-172 (1955).
43. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).
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the suspicion of at least one judge that all was not right in the court room,
and cause him to insist upon a thorough investigation of the charge. An
appeal or two should follow as a matter of course, irrespective of whether
the writ is eventually sustained or rejected.
The fistic encounter with the prison guard, spurious as it may be, is
capable of producing the same effect as the charge of mob intimidation.
Such an allegation has just enough flavor of lack of due process, or per-
haps of cruel and unusual punishment, to arouse a judge or two to action
and insist upon a thorough examination of it. However, if even this attempt
fails to liberate the prisoner, he is not at the end of his tether, for he may
still fall back upon such old standbys as the court lacking jurisdiction over
the crime of the piisoner, or acting under an unconstitutional law. It should
be stated here that to obtain the maximum benefits and results, each of these
objections must be raised separately and at different times, as well they
may under present procedures. To dispose of them in one proceeding would
vitiate the effectiveness of the time element, prevent the defendant from
finding a sympathetic judge should the first few prove disinterested, and
eliminate all possibility of exhausting or discouraging the prosecuting
attorney who might be willing eventually to settle for a plea to a lesser
charge.
One of the most serious results of federal interference with state
criminal judgments is the injury done to the prestige, dignity and morale
of the state trial judge. An unhealthy situation is created by this type of
intervention whether it be produced by a habeas corpus proceeding or by
review on appeal or under a writ of certiorari, though the first of these
doubtless provides the more devastating effect. A state trial judge may
represent the highest trial court of the state, and hence possess a coordinate
jurisdiction with the federal district judge, and yet, when his official
conduct in a criminal case is called to question, be bandied about by the
latter like an ordinary litigant. Under present practice, the federal judge
honestly may feel compelled to examine a state jurist in order to ascertain
whether a charge of want of due process, of forced confession or of some
other similar act of deprivation is true. It may be that there is involved a
dispute of fact between counsel for the defendant and the state judge re-
garding what occurred in the court room at the trial and on which the
written record is silent. Federal Court of Appeals Judge John J. Parker of
(Vol. 22
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the Fourth Circuit has described the plight of the state judge as follows:"
If heard at all in the habeas corpus litigation, it is required that
he [state judge] be heard as an ordinary witness. From this re-
sulted the unseemly spectacle of Federal District Courts trying the
regularity of proceedings had in courts of coordinate jurisdiction
and the state trial judges appearing as witnesses in defense of the
proceedings had in their courts.
United States Representative James C. Murray of Illinois, in a state-
ment to the House Judiciary Committee, painted an even more depressing
picture of the dilemma in which state judges, and state prosecutors too for
that matter, frequently find themselves :"
Under the present situation no lawyer's reputation is safe. No
prosecuting official's record in office is protected, no matter how
notable. No judge is protected from slanderous attacks of the
fertile mind of an incarcerated prisoner. In Illinois we have had
our most distinguished criminal lawyers charged with being in-
competent, without opportunity to defend such a charge. We
have some of our finest State prosecuting officials charged with
knowingly using perjured testimony and required to defend such
charges. We have had some of our most distinguished judges re-
quired to appear before Federal District judges in response to
groundless charges of State prisoners.
A very disconcerting feature of this type of federal review is that it
may subject state judges, prosecuting officers and even jurors to possible
civil and criminal suits for their official conduct. This is especially true
where the claim is advanced that the court in handling a criminal matter
violated a prisoner's federal constitutional right or has acted without
jurisdiction. Technically speaking, where an official proceeds without
jurisdiction he is not an official at all but merely a brash private citizen
intruding where he has no business. It goes without saying that a private
individual who participates in the illegal restraint of a person may become
liable for false arrest charges.
Mir. Justice Jackson was among those who recognized the delicate
44. Parker, Limiting Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949), quoted in
Hearings, supra n. 20 at p. 43.
45. Hearings, supra n. 20 at p. 65.
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situation in which state officials may find themselves when administering
criminal justice. On this point he declared:"
We [Supreme Court Justices] may look upon this unstable
prospect [setting aside state convictions under habeas corpus]
complacently, but state judges cannot. They are not only gradually
being subordinated to the Federal Judiciary, but Federal Courts
have declared that state officials and other officers are personally
liable to Federal prosecution and to civil suits by convicts if they
fail to carry out this court's constitutional doctrines.
The jurist then mentioned a specific court of appeals decision' where it
had been held that federal laws enforced in federal courts imposed a
personal liability upon state judicial officers. Such a result, had declared
that court, "is of fateful portent to the judiciary of the several states."'"
Federal judges, however, it should be noted, enjoy complete immunity in
similar situations and therefore need not worry about answering for their
illegal or unconstitutional conduct." Another federal court of appeals did
nothing to allay the uneasiness of state judges by asserting that in cases
where they are accused of illegal action, "wilfulness and intent are pre-
sumed and inferred from the result of the action. ' "o
Years ago the late Justice Marshall Harlan wrote on this theme in
a similarly ominous vein. He seemed to be admonishing state judges,
prosecutors and jurors to be especially careful when flirting with illegal
acts and unconstitutional laws, lest they suffer dire consequences. In one
of his opinions Harlan had this to say:"
That the petitioner is held under the authority of the state cannot
affect the question of power or jurisdiction of the circuit court to
inquire into the cause of his commitment and to discharge him, if he
be restrained of his liberty in violation of the constitution. The
46. Brown v. Allen, 343 U.S. 433, 534 (1953). See also Ex parto Common-
wealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168(1880); Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (1858); Home Telephone Company v. City
of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913) ; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 46 (1894).
47. Brown v. Allen, 343 U.S. 433, 535 (1953).
48. Picking v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 151 F.2d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 1945).
49. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
50. Koehler v. United States, 189 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1951), 342 U.S. 852(1951).
51. Ex parte Royal, 117 U.S. 241, 249 (1880).
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grand jurors, who found the indictment, the court into which it
was returned, and by whose orders he was arrested, and the officer
who holds him in custody, are all, equally with individual citizens,
under a duty for the discharge of which the state could not release
them, to respect and obey the supreme law of the land ...
Fortunately, for the cause of orderly administration of justice, few
civil or criminal prosecutions have been instituted against state judges,
prosecutors or jurors when acting in their purported official capacities.
However, these people can never be entirely certain that a rash of such
undertakings may not some day erupt, and this thought necessarily must
have a sobering and restraining influence upon them and all persons inclined
to offer themselves for public duty. A few prosecutions of this sort might
cause members of the bar to refuse service as judges or district attorneys
and laymen to hesitate to become sheriffs or jurors. Nor are state officials
protected necessarily by the lapse of time. For it seems that even though a
decade or so has passed since his conviction or confinement began, the
prisoner may still bring action against those participating in his illegal
incarceration.
Another disturbing aspect of federal intervention in this type of case
is the growing practice of a lone federal judge operating far from the scene
of the original trial to make findings of fact and actually decide cases on
the basis of written records made in the trial court or of stale evidence
taken by him years after the alleged offense was committed. At times, in
so doing, he must "look back of and beyond the records into unreported
proceedings conducted by other judges, with witnesses, lawyers and other
court officers long since dead and scattered" ;" or, he is required to search for
pertinent facts "when time has dulled memories, when death has stilled
tongues and records are unavailable.""3 The state juries and trial judges,
on the other hand, have not been forced in such cases to reply on an
inanimate transcribed record or cloudy recollections of remote happenings.
Rather, they have been able to predicate their verdicts on the utterances
and conduct of the live characters in the flesh whose testimony about
immediate events and whose entire demeanor they have been in a position
to scrutinize in minute detail. They have seen the parties squirm in the
'52. Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857 (C.C.A. D.C. 1945).
53. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 694 (1948).
25
Baker: Baker:Federal Judicial Control of State Criminal Justice
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1957
MISSOURI LAW BEVIEW [.
witness chair under close cross-examination, flush, hesitate to answer or
perhaps exhibit feigned anger, none of which actions the pen can describe
adequately, and yet which may speak far more eloquently than even the
spoken word.
Justices and judges in the federal appellate echelons must approach
perforce all cases originating in the state tribunals more or less in an
atmosphere of artificiality and abstraction. They are forced frequently
to hear cases third and fourth hand, and must resort to guesses, surmises
and conjectures in arriving at their decisions. Invariably, they must let
their imaginations do substitute for actual observation.
Not the least serious consequence of federal interference with state
judgments is the release of hardened criminals through the application
of abstract constitutional rights or of refined technicalities, thus robbing
all jurisdictions of the opportunity of bringing them to justice. After
being liberated, the prisoner in some instances is not required to face the
state tribunal again where errors in his trial may be corrected, and the
federal court, which has freed him, of course, has no authority to try him
for the crime charged. Justice Rufus W. Peckham, disturbed by these im-
plications years ago, was prompted to comment :r
It is an extremely delicate jurisdiction given the federal courts by
which a person under indictment in a state court, and subject to
its laws, may, by the decision of a single judge of the federal court,
upon a writ of habeas corpus, be taken out of the custody of the
officers of the state, and finally discharged therefrom, and thus a
trial by the state courts of an indictment under the laws of the
state be finally prevented.
Justice Samuel Miller, in the celebrated case of Cunningham v. Neagle,"
decided toward the close of the last century, indicated the frustration
which might envelop state criminal administration through the intervention
of federal tribunals. In that case, the defendant Neagle was charged by
the state of California with killing one David S. Terry. Neagle's defense
was that he had been deputized by the President of the United States to
guard Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field, who had been threatened
by Terry, and that the homicide had occurred in the performance of this
54. Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898).
55. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890).
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duty. It was on this ground that Neagle asked his release from state custody.
The United States Circuit Court sitting in California, without a jury
and in an ex parte proceeding, complied with Neagle's request, thereby
determining the question of fact whether Neagle had acted in his private
capacity and with intent to commit murder, or merely had executed his
official duty. In short, a federal tribunal rather than a state court, found
him not guilty; the state court was never afforded the opportunity to pass
on the issue.
Justice Miller stated the court's position in the matter in these words:
To the objection, made in argument, that the prisoner is discharged
by this writ from the power of the state court to try him for the
whole offense, the reply is that if the prisoner is held in the state
courts to answer for an act which it was his duty to do as marshal
of the United States, and if, in doing that act, he did no more than
what was necessary and proper for him to do, he cannot be guilty
of a crime under the law of the state of California. *When these
things are shown, it is established that he is innocent of any crime
against the laws of the state, or of any other authority whatever.
There is no occasion for any further trial in the state court, or in
any court. The circuit court of the United States was as competent
to ascertain these facts as any other tribunal, and it was not at all
necessary that a jury be impaneled to render a verdict on them.
There can be little quarrel with Miller's position in this particular
case. For in it was involved the sovereign authority of the federal
government to execute its own powers and functions; in a sense, its very
ability to survive was at issue. In such a situation that government must
be able to determine the extent and scope of its own prerogatives, even
to the point of freeing a prisoner held in state custody."' But where the
question is one of the purported procedural rights of an individual and
the sovereign authority of the federal government is not at stake, an
entirely different situation obtains. The issue then is whether the state, which
has been entrusted with the preservation of the public peace and repose of
56. There is no doubt that the federal courts may determine pertinent facts
in habeas corpus proceedings without the aid of a jury. No one has a constitutional
right to a jury in such cases, and even if he did, the prisoner could waive it, as
Neagle probably would have done. Whether an issue of this sort should be heard
ex parte without giving the state the opportunity to answer at the original hearing
raises the question of proper respect of one jurisdiction for the other.
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the community, shall be allowed to exert itself unfettered by national in-
terference. Serious doubt arises whether it can perform this duty if it
is to be subjected to continuous harassments and interventions from the
outside. Being closely associated with the police power, the state judges
and courts are in a far more advantageous position than their federal
counterparts to offer fair and equitable solutions to the issues arising there-
from.
Federal judicial intervention in state criminal proceedings frequently
not only adds nothing to the prestige of the state courts but succeeds in
tarnishing the lustre of our national tribunals. This has been particularly
true where the United States Supreme Court has descended from its lofty
perch to adjudicate a trivial matter which might be termed "police court
stuff", or what Justice Minton would call "a piddling case,' ' when it
should be devoting its energies and talents to questions involving broad
legal principles. Nor has the Court improved itself in the eyes of the
people when it has converted itself temporarily into what one Justice has
designated as a "super-legal-aid bureau.""8 This type of conversion has
occurred where a defendant has alleged representation by inadequate
counsel and the Supreme Court has been called upon to decree that he be
supplied with a suitable one. One one occasion a court of appeals judge
felt compelled to deny that the higher federal courts were "glorified parole
boards'.' designed to secure the release of certain prisoners from state
custody.
Numerous arguments are advanced from time to time not only for
retaining federal interference with state criminal judgments but even
for enlarging it. One such argument assumes that the federal courts alone
are interested in, capable of, and deserving to be trusted with, protecting
the liberties of the people. Such an attitude or charge casts a serious
reflection upon the integrity and qualifications of our state tribunals and
at the same time does umbrage to the intelligence of the voters. This con-
tention necessarily must be predicated on the notion that the electorate is
lacking in competence to select officials adapted morally and talent-wise to
safeguard both the public and the individual interests. In support of this
claim, it must be conceded that unfit and dishonest state judges and dis-
57. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 18 (1954).
58. Uveges v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 450 (1948).
59. U.S. ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 1948).
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trict attorneys at times have been chosen. However, it should also be
pointed out that this practice has not been confined to state personnel, for
a number of federal judges appointed by the president with the advice
and consent of the Senate have been shown to be incompetent, corrupt,
biased and ready to play politics with justice. Some of them have been
impeached, and a few even convicted.
The belief that the federal judiciary possesses greater judicial talent,
wisdom, virtue and sense of fairness than our state courts finds little
acceptance among the legal fraternity. The membership of that group is
well aware that a large number of our ablest and most respected jurists are
on the state benches, to which they have been elevated as a result of long
and tried periods of service in the legal arena, whereas numerous federal
judges have come to their high positions as strictly political accidents and
have remained true to type to the end. Large numbers of the latter might
have fared poorly at the hands of both the voters and the bar associations
asked to pass on their qualifications. Moreover, there are a few lawyers
who would not be willing to match the skill, learning and sagacity of the
incumbents of many of our highest state courts with those of the United
States Supreme Court. The same thing can be said of trial judges in the
two respective jurisdictions. Any claim that federal jurists are endowed
with an inherent infallibility or occult powers was dispelled recently by
Justice Jackson, who knew his judges and courts well. The Justice put it
in this manner:"
Reversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby
better done. There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme
Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts
would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible,
but are infallible only because we are final.
On the occasion of making this observation, Jackson was prompted
to remark that some members of the federal hierarchy were guided frequently
by their personal whims about justice and not by settled rules and princi-
ples in deciding habeas corpus as well as other judicial questions. A federal
habeas corpus proceeding he characterized, for example, as an "ad hoe
determination of due process of law issues by personal notions of justice
60. Brown v. Allen, 343 U.S. 433, 540 (1953).
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instead of known rules of law."" He felt impelled also to declare that the
expansion of the Supreme Court's power in this area had reached the
point "where any state conviction disapproved by a majority of this court,
thereby becomes unconstitutional and subject to nullification by habeas
corpus."" iHe was likewise contrained to say: "The belief is widely held
by the practicing profession that this Court no longer respects impersonal
rules of law but is guided in these matters by personal impressions which
from time to time may be shared by a majority of the Justices."
At the same time Justice Jackson was criticizing his own colleagues
for lacking objectivity, Chief Judge John J. Parker, referred to above, was
commending state judges for possessing it. Judge Parker, who had enjoyed
a long span of experience in both state and federal courts as advocate and
judge, ventured this opinion: "The state courts are by and large just as
patriotic and just as learned as the federal courts, and if a man has any real
merit in his contention that he has not had a fair trial, he will get that con-
tention corrected in the state courts."' Chief Justice Melville Fuller, for
more than twenty years presiding justice of the nation's highest tribunal, is
credited with making an analogous observation. He is reported to have
declared that there was no reason to suppose that state courts were not aware
of the great principles of the federal constitution designed to protect life and
liberty as the federal courts, nor that the state courts would not give them
effect."5
Those urging the continuance of federal control over state criminal
justice insist that it is necessary in order to prevent certain injustices which
emanate occasionally from the state courts. To buttress their position, they
single out a couple of decisions. They allude, for example, to the recent
court case of De Meerleer v. Michigan,' in which Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for the Supreme Court, rebuked Michigan's highest tribunal for
upholding a conviction of a defendant for whom no counsel had been
61. Id. at 532.
62. Id. at 534.
63. Id. at 535.
64. Hearings, op. cit., supra n. 20 at p. 10.
65. Id. at 17.
66. De Meerleer v. Michigan, 313 Mich. 548, 21 N.W.2d 849 (1946) ; Daniels v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 511 (1953); Marion v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 56 (1947). Twenty
years after his conviction it was discovered that Marion had been deprived of his
right to counsel at his original trial.
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appointed. They likewise mention the celebrated Scottsboro case in which
the United States Supreme Court several years earlier made a similar
criticism of the Alabama Supreme Court.1
7
In the Michigan case, the conviction of the defendant was upheld
unanimously by the state supreme court, which consisted of eight able and
qualified judges. All of these judges concurred in the prevailing opinion
which read :
Our examination of the record requires the conclusion that De
Meerleer freely and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the charge of
murder at the time the court sentenced him to life imprison-
ment. . . . Nor was he denied any constitutional right of repre-
sentation, or public trial or orderly and due process of law. There
can be no doubt from the testimony produced prior to the sentence
that De Meerleer was guilty of the crime of murder.
In the Scottsboro case, where in addition to the claim of lack of counsel
there was adduced the allegation of mob pressure, not only the trial judge
and the Supreme Court of Alabama 9 but also two of the nine justices of the
United States Supreme Court found no evidence of unfairness in the
proceeding. The two justices vigorously dissented from the prevailing
opinion.
From these two experiences naturally arises this query: What reason
is there to believe that the Michigan court was wrong and the United
States Supreme Court right, or that the Alabama judges and two high
federal justices were incorrect and the seven other Supreme Court justices
were not? A further question is: In such cases as these, where there are as
many judges supporting one side of an issue as the other, should not the
benefit of the doubt be resolved invariably in favor of constitutionality
rather than unconstitutionality ?
Although injustices unquestionably have been done by state courts
and will continue to be made, the records of the state judges, on the whole,
for effectuating justice have been amazingly good. Even the proponents
of federal intervention in state criminal proceedings when confronted with
67. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
68. People v. De Meerleer, supra n. 66.
69. The Chief Justice dissented.
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pertinent statistics are compelled to concede this to be true. According to
Hon. Henry P. Chandler, Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, during the nine years from 1946 through 1954, four
thousand eight hundred forty-nine applications for federal writs of
habeas corpus to set aside state convictions were presented to the national
tribunals, only 79, or one and six-tenths per cent, of which were granted.
And of these seventy-nine, the federal courts gave the petitioners relief in
but a handful."0 In other words, to use the baseball vernacular, the batting
average of the state courts has been somewhat above .990.
It would appear, therefore, that if even the federal courts themselves
must admit that the state tribunals have been correct at least 98.6 per cent
of the time when their convictions have been challenged, it is not completely
amiss to surmise that the state courts may have been right in those few cases
where the writs were granted and the prisoners discharged. To state the
proposition a little differently, can it be said that courts, which have been
correct admittedly in nearly ninety-nine per cent of cases, could have been
so badly mistaken in the lone one per cent that injustices would have
resulted necessarily had their judgments been sustained rather than set
aside?
One solution to the indiscriminate interference by federal courts
with state judicial administration is for these tribunals to practice the art
of self-denial far more than they now do. The federal district courts could
easily refuse to entertain petitions for writs of habeas corpus or grant stays
of execution except in extreme cases. The Supreme Court, for its part,
might indulge in a similar policy of self-abnegation by denying writs of
certiorari on appeals in state criminal cases save where there is a patent
violation of a constitutional right. Whether such demonstrations of fore-
bearance on the part of those judges who have strong prejudices on the
subject of civil rights and are ready to grant writs of habeas corpus or writs
of certiorari at the slightest provocation are too much to expect is an open
question.
If the federal courts refuse to exercise self-restraint in issuing the writ,
Congress may be required to assert itself in the matter. It may be compelled
to curtail substantially or completely by law their powers in this respect.
The curtailment might be accomplished by returning the writ to the status
70. Hearings, op. cit., supra n. 20, at 21.
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it enjoyed under the law of 1789, as was suggested by the Association of
Attorneys General in 1953."' Or, should this remedy appear too severe,
Congress might repeal the law of 1867 and thus return the process to the
position it possessed prior to the enactment of that statute. The writ then
would be governed by not only the law of 1789 but also the acts of 1833
and 1842.
But even such congressional action would still leave state criminal
judgments at the mercy of the United States Supreme Court. This tribunal
under certiorari would continue to review such judgments and thereby keep
criminal administration more or less in a state of constant suspense and
uncertainty. No one logically can object to having that court review these
judgments where the state tribunals obviously have taken jurisdiction over
matters reserved by the constitution or law for federal control; nor could
there be any justifiable complaint where this bench hears appeals involving
the express prohibitions imposed on the states by the fundamental law such
as those pertaining to ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and involuntary
servitude. But when it seizes upon such a vague and undefined concept as
due process of law and gives it interpretations which spell out juris-
dictions foreign to our jurisprudence and designed to encompass within
the federal judicial embrace numerous subjects which can be handled
more competently on a state level, a different situation presents itself, and
gives the states real grounds for grievance.
The most effective way of course, to restrict the federal judicial power
over state criminal cases is to repeal the fourteenth amendment, or at least
revise it so that it can no longer be used as the authority for the present
more or less free-for-all federal intervention in such matters. Congress
then would be unable to endow the federal courts with the broad compre-
hensive power of review which they now have; nor could such courts ever
assert that they possessed it under a self-executing constitutional authority.
With the national tribunals thus restrained, the general administration of
criminal justice would be turned back to the states, which would be allowed
to maintain law and order with a minimum of harassment. A cardinal
principle of good administration incidentally is that authority should go
hand in hand with responsibility.
71. Id. at 60.
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State courts, as previously stated, have on rare occasions wrought
injustices, and they will continue to do so. But just as one swallow does
not make a summer, so does not an infrequent infringement of private rights
warrant allowing federal tribunals to hang like the sword of Damocles over
the heads of their state counterparts, ready to fall at the slightest intima-
tion of error. Such a condition, after a while, can become insufferable.
In this country with its humane and intelligent population, it is
difficult to imagine the voters within a state tolerating for long a truly
evil condition which outrages the general public's sense of decency and
fair play. If such a condition should exist, the voters doubtless would see
to it that their lawmakers enact the necessary corrective legislation and
that judges and prosecutors are selected who will administer justice in
an enlightened and even-handed manner. That the people can be so trusted
was well expressed not so long ago by a prominent historian:"
Our own experiences . . . justifies Jefferson's faith that men need
no masters-not even judges. It justifies us, too, in believing that
majority will not imperil minority rights, either in theory or in
operation.
72. COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 82 (1943).
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